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Constitutional

Law-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS FROM

COLLEGE NEWSPAPER ADVOCATING SEGREGATIONALIST POLICY DEEMED VIOLATIVE OF FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS-Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d

456 (4th Cir. 1973).
Modern courts have consistently held that the rights of free speech and
press provided for in the first amendment are fundamental rights protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from abridgment
by the states.' Student expression has been the target of much recent
litigation and has prompted increased Supreme Court concern over constitutional aspects of public school administration. 2 The central controversy
has developed into a question of how much freedom should be given to a
generation that delights in exploring the "limits of institutional response." 3
One of the most piercing probes has been the campus newspaper 4 which
has recently been afforded a limited degree of first amendment protection.
1. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (extends
protection as against impairment by state agency). Prior to Lovell, it had been the settled
rule that the first amendment limitation on federal abridgement of freedom of speech or press
was not applicable to state action. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922). See 16
Am.JuR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 341 (1965).
2. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statute prohibiting teaching of the Darwinian
theory of evolution was violative of free speech under the first and fourteenth amendments);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (right of teacher to express criticism of
administration); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring student to salute
flag and pledge allegiance violated first and fourteenth amendment's right of expression);
Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970) (hairstyle regulation he!d to be partially
invalid); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970) (hairstyle regulation upheld); Brooks
v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) (speaker bans); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968), afl'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905
(1969) (demonstrations).
3. See Abbot, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. Ray. 1 (1969). A
surging interest in this new concept of academic freedom for students can be noted in the
case law that has developed over the past decade. The Supreme Court has thrown considerable support behind the student and appears to have afforded him a special privilege which
can best be exemplified by the following excerpt from Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967):
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom . . . .The classroom is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection." Id. at 603
(citations omitted).
4. While the student press serves such worthy administrative functions as distributing
information, breaking down impersonalities in the academic structure and bringing greater
communication between all parties on campus, at the same time it occupies a powerful
position in the college hierarchy. Its relatively homogeneous readership enables concentration
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In Joyner v. Whiting,5 financial support for The Campus Echo, a student
publication at North Carolina Central University, was withheld by Whiting, president of the previously all-black university, following circulation
of its first issue advocating a strong segregationalist policy. The paper's
editor, Joyner, featured an article which urged Blacks to assert themselves
as a proud people separate from Caucasians in every way. In addition, he
expressed alarm at the increasing number of whites on campus and demanded an end to their admittance and the preservation of the school's
all-black status.' The court held that Whiting had not sustained the burden7 of showing justification for his denial of the right of expression and
declared the suspension of funding unwarranted. 8
The fundamental obstacle to constitutional relief in censorship of student expression has been in defining the relationship between the student
and the school.' Although the unsettled state of this area of the law makes
on issues of greatest concern and augments its capability to direct the forces in support of
those issues. See Abbot, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1
(1969).
5. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
6. The headline of the paper read, "Is NCCU Still a Black School?". In the editorial which
occupied front page space, Joyner noted that "until we [the black community] assume the
role of a strong, proud people we will continue to be co-opted. Until we chose [sic] to make
this clear, by any means necessary, the same thing will continue to happen [referring to the
onslaught of white students] . . ." Id. at 458. In keeping with this policy, Joyner restricted
his staff to black students and limited his advertisers to black merchants, a policy that was
later withdrawn following the suspension of funding.
7. It is interesting to note the protection afforded student rights by the courts in light of
the recently abandoned privilege concept which sanctioned most types of disciplinary action,
see note 11 infra. Of partifular interest is that Whiting, a school official who heretofore had
occupied a position that entitled him to an unlimited array of disciplinary procedures, should
have to carry the burden of proof for the reasonableness of his action in this instance. 477
F.2d at 461.
8. The case was remanded to the district court on the question of the discriminatory
staffing and advertising policies of the Echo. If there were found to be a danger of a reinstatement of this policy, the court was directed to enjoin the practice. 477 F.2d at 463.
9. One of three theories is generally advanced in an analysis of the problem. Some courts
accept the in loco parentis line of reasoning, but this has proven to be unsatisfactory for two
reasons. Commentators argue that while the parent-child relationship cannot be dissolved,
the school system must be able to suspend the unruly student who makes the education of
others more difficult. See Comment, Private Government on the Campus-JudicialReview
of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1379-80 (1963). Likewise, there is inconsistency
in interpreting the in loco parentis doctrine as granting the school parental powers without
the accompanying responsibilities. Other courts have relied on a contract theory finding
consideration on both sides. However, the contract theory has proven to be unreasonable in
its preference of the institutions. See Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1958); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928). For a good
discussion of these two theories and the third concept of privilege see Comment,
Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
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the formulation of general rules particularly difficult, there has been a
trend away from the older concept of "privilege""0 which regarded school
attendance a matter of grace that could be terminated at the will of administrators for failure to comply with regulations assented to by the student
at the time of admittance." Conditions which fostered the privilege ideology gradually disappeared and were replaced by a new set of circumstances" that prompted the courts to take a fresh look at student rights. The
result was a recognition of the right of academic freedom" which conceded
that attending a public university might be regarded a privilege, but denied the state the right to condition the granting of such privilege on the
10. The concept was developed in Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 261-62 (1934). In that
case the Supreme Court spoke of school attendance as a matter of grace which might be
terminated at the will of administrators for failure to comply with regulations to which the
student was presumed to have assented upon admittance.
11. See, e.g., Steier v. State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959). In this case a
student who felt that administrators were exerting excessive control over student organizations voiced strong opposition in letters to the president of Brooklyn College. His resulting
suspension led to court action which was to test his constitutional rights. The court held that
he was not free to stay on campus in his former capacity as a student, for he had been
admitted to the school "not as a matter of right but as a matter of grace after having agreed
to conform to its rules and regulations." Id. at 20 (Moore, J., concurring). The decision was
a correct one in light of the legal environment which at that time embraced the privilege
concept. For greater insight into the discarded privilege theory see Wright, The Constitution
on the Campus, 22 VAND.L. Rav. 1027 (1969).
12. The entire nature of the education process has changed since Hamilton v. Regents, 293
U.S. 245 (1934). Today college education has discarded its luxury status and has taken on
the characteristics of a necessity for many high school students as an increasing number of
employers demand it as a prerequisite for job opportunities. In addition, the trend toward
the current situation and away from the aging concept of privilege can be evidenced by the
increased state involvement in educational funding as well as increased enrollment.
13. See Dickey v. State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), where the court
noted that although there was no legal obligation on the college to operate the newspaper or
to have Dickey as its editor, because it did authorize both, it could not, as a branch of the
state, suspend Dickey without violating the first and fourteenth amendments. The following
excerpt evidences the emphasis given academic freedom in deciding the case:
We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioners' liberties in the
areas of academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government should
be extremely reticent to tread.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field
of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet
be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles
are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die. Id. at 619 quoting Sweezy v. State, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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relinquishment of constitutional rights. 4
In Joyner, the majority felt that a permanent denial of financial support
to the college paper because of its editorial policy was a denial of the
freedom of speech.' 5 The court followed the rationale of those decisions
which have recognized and given precedent value to the recent widespread
application of student constitutional rights in the area of journalism.' 6
However, the fourth circuit was careful to withdraw its support of the
student press before reaching the limits of freedom afforded professional
journalists.1 7 Joyner falls within an emerging graduation of control which
varies from the broad freedom granted professionals to more restrictive
limitations at the college level and even more narrowly defined liberties in
the secondary school.' 8 The court felt that there should be some limits
placed on the student press, but that such limitations should meet the well
established tests of reasonability.' 9 School officials have been given the
authority to suppress expression in those special cases where they can
"reasonably . . .forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities." 2 In Joyner, the court noted that Whiting's action
14. Id. at 618. Since the time of the Dickey decision, there has been no challenge by any
state or federal court to the proposition establishing constitutional rights in students at a
public institution of higher learning. However, opposition to this principle has been expressed
in dictum of Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967). See Wright, note 11
supra.
15. Whiting argued unsuccessfully that the complete withdrawal of financial support could
not constitute censorship since the idea of permanency was not commensurate with the
application and withdrawal of funds according to the subjective judgment of a censor. The
court cited authority which disproved of prohibitions on freedom of speech calculated "to
burn the house to roast the pig." 477 F.2d at 462, quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383 (1957).
16. See, e.g., Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (censorship cannot be
imposed by suspending student editors); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) (nor
by withdrawing financial support for student publications); Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School
Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (nor can it be imposed by suppressing circulation).
17. The Joyner court suggested that it was not willing to apply the liberal standards to the
college press that the Supreme Court applied in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). 477 F.2d at 462.
18. The logic behind such a progression seems to be based on a belief held by commentators
that the degree of moral restraint practiced by publishing journalists diminishes as one passes
from the professional ranks into the secondary school press. See Comment, Developments in
the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HAlv. L. REv. 1045, 1128 (1968).
19. The Joyner opinion notes authority which places limits on the student press by permitting a somewhat limited exercise of censorship. Essential to the institution of such a policy
of literary suppression is the presence of some basis on which the school official might reasonably believe that such restrictions are warranted. This usually includes the likelihood of
material and substantial interference with the operation of school rules, classes, or other
activities. 477 F.2d at 461.
20. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). The Court
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might have been warranted had he satisfied this objective test of foreseeability, 2' but failing to meet this criterion, his withdrawal of funds served
as a denial of the constitutionally protected freedom of speech.
Of primary interest in Joyner is the fact that the court chose to give
decisive weight to the question of student rights even though adoption of
that line of reasoning meant rejection of the civil rights argument involved.
It would appear that the issue of academic freedom overshadowed the
segregationalist policy advocated by the Echo, preventing its emergence as
a major issue. Such a result is inconsistent with the current national policy
against support of segregated education 2 2-a policy so compelling that it
has overridden the general freedom to dispose of property,2 and even limited rights granted by the first amendment.24 The court sidestepped the
argument that a continued discriminatory policy by the Echo could, if
interpreted as "state action" promoting such advocacy, result in suspension of federal funding as provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The
majority disposed of this question by labeling the newspaper's function one
of state "advocacy" rather than state "action" which would have called
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into play. 26 This decision was reached despite
authority that has regarded the student press as an arm of the state.2
An argument might be advanced in Whiting's behalf which would qualify his censorship as being reasonable when judged by the standards estabalso provided that school officials must show that their "action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint." Id. at 509.
21. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1973). The circuit court felt that no
danger of physical violence or harm to the white students was apparent from the record,
thereby making the permanent restriction on funding unnecessary.
22. The policy spoken of was formulated in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
and in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) where the court assigned school
administrators the duty "to conveit to a unitary school system in which racial discrimination
could be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 438.
23. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
24. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
25. Strong support for judicial concern with desegregation can be found in sections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which authorize suspension of federal assistance to programs and
agencies which practice discrimination in their selection of participants. Civil Rights Act of
U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)-(d-1) (1970).
1964,
. 26. 42
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1973). Circuit Judge Field,
in his dissenting opinion, expressed dissatisfaction with the court's resolution of this issue, saying that civil
rights considerations outweighed the student rights question and whether the editorial be
labelled "advocacy" or "action" it violated the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 477 F.2d at 466.
27. College newspapers have qualified as governmental activities where, as here, they are
published within the framework of a state supported institution utilizing public facilities. See
Panarella v. Birenbaum, 37 A.D.2d 987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 753, 757 (1971).
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lished in those decisions which have countenanced free speech limitations
where they were exercised to prevent material disruption of school activities.28 The success of such an argument depends on the court's willingness
to extend the scope of the reasonability tests to include a nonviolent,
financially motivated type of disruption rather than limiting their applicability to instances where violence would naturally follow the student advocacy. More specifically, if federal agencies act in accordance with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and withdraw funds from the university as they have
in similar cases of noncompliance,29 such withdrawal would result in curtailment of activities that depend on federal aid. The educational process
would have been impaired just as effectively as if violence had erupted on
campus. It is submitted that such a policy would not be a deviation from
precedent but an amplification of the tests to encompass all types of disruption, nonviolent as well as violent. This would not alter the purpose of
the reasonableness standard but would focus its concern on the elimination
of disorganization in public school systems resulting from an irresponsible
student press."
C.F.C., III
28. See Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.
Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
29. State v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
30. The court did not find that Joyner's activity was irresponsible or disruptive. See note
21 supra. However, it is submitted that this result was reached because it limited its definition of "disruption" to violent interference which was not present in Joyner. The argument
advanced in the text is predicated upon nonviolent disorganization which was not considered
by the court. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).

